The space between human rights and the right to regulate by Broude, Tomer & Henckels, Caroline
The space between human rights and
the right to regulate
Caroline Henckels, Tomer Broude 2021-03-13T08:00:56
We are thankful for the opportunity provided by Völkerrechtsblog and the Leiden
Journal of International Law (LJIL) to discuss our recent article on the loss-gain
frame of investor rights and human rights that we identify in investment arbitration;
and we are especially grateful to Oliver Hailes for his close engagement with the
article in his comment. Before addressing several issues arising from that helpful
response, it is to some extent gratifying to first point out what has not been contested
in it. Non-trivially, this is at least the utility of applying insights from behavioural
economics and cognitive psychology to problems in international law and policy.
Such an approach is still quite new, and although certainly not yet in the mainstream,
it is gaining traction through a variety of methods and diverse subfields, including
the study of international arbitration and investment arbitrators. It is good to be
able to conduct a discussion on the substance of the arguments, moving beyond
preliminary (academic) remonstrances that were commonplace not so long ago
(e.g., objections to the attempts, through empirical research, to examine how jurists
respond cognitively to the law, or to explain judicial preferences in extra-legal terms).
Moreover, another issue that can be set aside for present purposes and within this
limited space, is acknowledgement of a general normative discontent with the ways
in which international investment protection law and practice have impacted upon,
and have demonstrated the potential to negatively impact upon, the human rights
of local groups of non-investors in host States. This is not key either to our thesis or
to Hailes’ antithesis, but can be recognized as a shared problem; indeed, without
this normative concern, there would be few non-technical reasons to deal with the
questions of human rights and investment in international law, that are the crux of
this discussion and the LJIL symposium.
Through his lens of choice – the host States’ ‘right to regulate’, a somewhat
nebulous concept that has been dealt with in depth both generally, e.g., by Titi,
and with more specific regard to human rights, by Mouyal (and her proposed
‘duty to regulate’ as a bridge between investment law and human rights law) –
Hailes engages with the two strands of our article, namely, (1) our jurisprudential
analysis of the tendency of arbitral tribunals to use the language of rights with
respect to investor claims, without a solid and consistent theoretical basis; and (2)
the propensity of tribunals (in our view a consequence of the former observation)
to frame investor claims as past endowments lost with certainty, competing (so
to speak), with the human rights of non-investors that are framed as uncertain,
aspirational future gains. Generally, Hailes partially critiques our doctrinal bid to
clarify and specify the nature of the investor-State relationship under International
Investment Agreements (IIAs) in Hohfeldian terms, in particular with respect to the
right to regulate; and subsequently, regarding our cognitive framing analysis, argues
that ‘reframing investor-State arbitration through the duty to regulate might escape
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the loss-gain frame by avoiding the technical pitfalls of rights talk…’. This latter point
is a very intriguing proposition, especially since ‘reframing’ is precisely one of the
strategies that can, if properly designed, overcome cognitive biases in decision-
making, especially framing effects associated with Prospect Theory, as developed
by Kahneman and Tversky, such as the loss-gain frame we identify in our article.
Reframing is also a strategy employed vis-à-vis socio-legal frames, as discussed by
Moshe Hirsch in his contribution to the current LJIL symposium, also highlighted in
this blog debate. Interestingly, Hirsch’s recommendations appear to be diametrically
opposed to those of Hailes and more in line with ours, i.e., to expand the socio-legal
framing of investment arbitration beyond the investor-State dyad, and to explicitly
include human rights bearers – a point we return to later in this rejoinder. We briefly
address both these strands – the doctrinal and the behavioral – below.
Jurisprudential analysis
Hailes suggests that the Hohfeldian immunity/disability relationship (one of the
possible specifications we propose (p.97)) is inapt to describe some standards of
investment protection such as fair and equitable treatment (FET). We respectfully
disagree. In this paradigm, the investor is ‘immune’ from conduct of the State in
breach of the treaty obligations or relevant customary international law, through
the ability to vindicate their claim in ISDS. Correlatively, a State is ‘disabled’
from engaging in conduct that constitutes a breach of FET, be it failure to act in
accordance with the investor’s legitimate expectations, failure to regulate reasonably,
failure to act with due process, etc. To be sure, the immunity/disability relationship
is, as noted, only one path to be pursued in specifying the nature of investor
claims as rights (which indeed may vary depending on the substance of the treaty
or customary obligation). We are not wedded to a particular analysis, merely
highlighting the need for greater analytical clarity.
Thus, in a footnote to our article (fn. 18) we characterised the State’s ‘right to
regulate’ as a (limited) ‘privilege’ in the Hohfeldian sense. A privilege is a legal
permission to engage in conduct. The jural correlative of a privilege is a ‘no-right’:
because the State has a privilege to regulate, the investor has no-right to rely on
the coercive powers of the State (here, at the level of international law, the relevant
analogue would be recourse to ISDS) to prevent or remedy an act done pursuant to
this privilege. The concept of a privilege helps to shed light on the proposition that
government action properly falling within the right to regulate is arguably beyond the
purview of State liability. Conceiving of the right to regulate as a privilege is further
illuminating because it illustrates the boundaries of investors’ ability to rely on ISDS
to vindicate a claim of mistreatment: where the State is exercising its (residual) right
to regulate, the protections of the treaty may simply not be engaged and hence
no remedy is owed. Going one step further, there is no analytical incompatibility
between the right to regulate (as a privilege of the State) and the characterisation
of the investor’s position as an immunity vis-à-vis the State’s disability, because the
right to regulate is carved out from the investment treaty obligations themselves.
Investment tribunal decisions take the right to regulate as a point of departure – a
baseline – but do not permit a State to, for example, regulate contrary to an express
commitment of regulatory stability.
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We agree with Hailes that the right to regulate may have other dimensions: some are
privileges and some are powers (and some may even be immunities, as discussed
below). It is also correct that Hohfeldian relations are between only two legal
persons and cannot monolithically account for triadic or quadratic relationships
(host State, home State, investor, host State population). However, one act (the
State’s conduct in relation to the investor and vice versa) may affect multiple legal
relationships, relevantly the relationship of the investor and the host State with the
latter’s population.
Giannakopoulos has suggested that the right to regulate is a power in the Hohfeldian
sense, as have Davison and Emerton in the context of the regulation of intellectual
property. Hohfeld tells us that a power means the legal ability to change the
structure of the legal relationship – the power to create rights and impose duties. The
correlative of a power is a liability, which is the possibility that one’s legal relationship
will be changed when another person uses their power or the subjection of the other
person to the exercise of the power. The depiction of the right to regulate as a power
elucidates that an investor is liable to the prospect that their legal relationship will be
changed when the State exerts its power.
However, States’ power to alter their legal relationship vis-à-vis investors exists only
in a limited sense, provided that they do not breach FET (for example) in doing so.
This in turn highlights the inherent problem with the concept of the right to regulate,
which at the end of the day is hollowed out where investment tribunals impose
stringent standards of conduct on host States. While the starting point in international
law is that in the absence of international commitments to the contrary, the State
enjoys an untrammelled right to regulate – otherwise thought of as the ‘regulatory
space’ of the State – some of this power, this space, is foregone when a State enters
an IIA. Reliance on the idea of the right to regulate in this way is reminiscent of
treaty provisions that affirm states’ regulatory power through measures “otherwise
consistent with this [Agreement]” (such as Article 9.16 of the CPTPP), which are by
some accounts potentially meaningless in that they subject the State’s regulatory
power to the provisions of the treaty and, where relevant, to their interpretation by
tribunals.
The analytical waters of viewing the right to regulate as a right in doctrinal terms,
are further muddied when one considers its position in treaty exceptions and the
customary state of necessity, as Giannakopoulos has suggested One wonders
whether characterizing exceptions as permissions rather than defences, as one of us
has previously proposed, would change the characterisation of the right to regulate
– and if so, how. All this is to say that while we are categorical about the need to
better flesh out the characterization of the architecture of rights in IIAs and ISDS,
including the ‘right to regulate’ we are less categorical about one particular such
characterization.
Problems of focusing on the ‘right to regulate’
We now move on from the more doctrinal and analytical ‘rights talk’ issues to the
behavioral framing questions, focusing on Hailes’ suggestion that reframing of ISDS
human rights concerns (of host-State non-investors) through the lens of the ‘right to
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regulate’ could shift arbitrators’ conceptions towards a ‘normative priority’ for human
rights. As noted, this suggestion is quite attractive. We would mention, however, the
following few weaknesses and obstacles towards its realization.
First, we wonder if this would at all constitute a reframing and not an undesirable
regression in terms. The ‘interaction of investor claims and the State’s right
to regulate’ that Hailes refers to is in many respects the standard structural
framework that continues to pervade debates over IIAs and ISDS, most crudely (yet
fundamentally) along the lines of ‘pro-State/pro-investor’ binarities (bringing in a host
of other types of contested biases, including affiliation bias). Indeed, as we believe
we demonstrate in the article, the arbitrators’ natural starting point is the adversarial
relationship of the litigating parties – the claimant/investor and the respondent/
host State. If anything, the shift in framing should be towards a more tangible legal
presence of the host-State non-investors – perhaps akin to what Professor Philippe
Sands argued in his partial dissent in Bear Creek vs. Peru, in a particular legal and
factual construct, with respect to indigenous peoples rights under ILO Convention
No. 169, and indeed closer to some of our recommendations and those of Moshe
Hirsch.
Second, reverting to the more intuitive, traditional, investor claim vs. regulatory
space frame of mind (while side-lining the concerns of host-State non-investors)
could perhaps mitigate, but would not obviate, the cognitive loss-gain frame. The
governmental act of regulation, even of expropriation, has the optic of a gain, real
or potential – otherwise, why has the host State acted so? – whereas the investor
claim, by definition, is one of a loss. Hence, reverting to the State-investor frame
does not solve the structural cognitive imbalance.
Third, Hailes is essentially suggesting that the host State’s right to regulate can
be assimilated to the human rights of the non-investors in the host State, perhaps
as a proxy for them. The legal construction that Hailes proffers in this regard is
refreshingly both more explicit and more elegant than what is found in most of
the arbitral decisions that we survey in the article. It is not, however, a panacea,
and to some extent is merely a reformulation of some of the problems that we
highlight, as noted above. The additional problem for human rights, especially
with the introduction of the tentative idea of a ‘duty to regulate’, is that the right to
regulate is not legally, functionally or empirically linked to the realization of host-
State, non-investor human rights. State regulatory space can be analysed without
direct reference to human rights, and indeed, the right to regulate under investment
law, if not adjusted normatively, includes capacities to violate human rights, as a
double-edged sword.
Fourth and finally, we must recall who it is that actually does the framing in
arbitration: private parties’ and government counsel, and the arbitrators themselves.
In other words, it is the decision-makers who both design the decision frame and
make their decisions within it – what in other circumstances could be termed as
‘negotiated choice architecture’. Tversky and Kahneman in 1981 noted the difficulty
in tackling framing effects when the frames are ‘determined partly by the formulation
of the problem and partly by the norms, habits and personal characteristics of the
decision maker’. In other words, even if reframing to the right (or duty) to regulate
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could potentially be effective in addressing non-investor human rights, who would
‘bell the cat’ and turn it into practice? Not the arbitrators; not the counsel bent on
winning the case; certainly not the investors; maybe the host governments, but they
don’t necessarily have an ex ante interest in human rights, to say the least. Perhaps
the affected non-investor parties?
Once again, we thank Hailes, the Völkerrechtsblog and the Leiden Journal of
International Law for the opportunity to further elaborate on our article.
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